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SUMMARY With the increasing demand for services provided by Com-
munication networks, quality and reliability of such services as well as 
confidentiality of data transfer are becoming ones of the highest concerns. 
At the same time, because of growing hacker's activities, quality of pro-
vided content and reliability of its continuous delivery strongly depend on 
integrity of data transmission and availability of communication infrastruc-
ture, thus on information security of a given IT landscape. But, the amount 
of resources allocated to provide information security (like security staff, 
technical countermeasures and etc.) must be reasonable from the economic 
point of view. This fact, in turn, leads to the need to employ a forecasting 
technique in order to make planning of IT budget and short-term planning 
of potential bottlenecks. In this paper we present an approach to make 
such a forecasting for a wide class of information security related incidents 
(ISRI) - unambiguously detectable ISRl. This approach is based on differ-
ent auto regression models which are widely used in financial time series 
analysis but can not be directly applied to ISRI time series due to specifics 
related to information security. We investigate and address this specifics by 
proposing rules (special conditions) of collection and storage of ISRI time 
series, adherence to which improves forecasting in this subject field. We 
present an application of our approach to one type of unambiguously de-
tectable ISRI - ill110unt of spam messages which, if not mitigated properly, 
could create additional load on communication infrastructure and consume 
significant amounts of network capacity. Finally we evaluate our approach 
by simulation and actual measurement. 
key words: jl1/ormatiol1 securiTY incidents, forecasting, planning 
1. Introduction 
At the current moment web-based services and other type 
of network based applications are becoming more and more 
popular. Nowadays users have become very experienced in 
newest technology and demand not only for new function-
ality and solutions but also for quality of service in terms 
of technology and comfort. At the same time, as more and 
more information is stored in the digital form (sometimes 
only in digital form), the loss of data, its unauthorized mod-
ification or problems with access for authorized users be-
cause of technical failures are becoming more and more crit-
ical even in terms of utility (for example lack of privacy can 
lead to lack of comfort of usage of some solution and thus 
to a negative impression). So in order to attract more cus-
tomers to use new products and solutions, potential users 
must be provided with confidence that their data and iden-
tity are adequately protected. 
At the same time as providing information security is 
Manuscript received October 23, 2009. 
Manuscript revised January 30, 2010. 
tThe authors are with University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba-shi, 
305-8577 Japan. 
a) E-mail: romanov@cipher.risk.tsukuba.ac.jp 
DOl: 10.1587 /transcom.E93.B.1411 
among non-profit earning business processes, it must be or-
ganized in the cost effective manner-price of implementa-
tion and maintenance of different countermeasures must be 
strictly evaluated in terms ofjustif-iability of related security 
investment. For example: is it really necessary to hire more 
IT security team members in a given enterprise? Is there any 
sense to buy a honey pod system for your private notebook? 
Or will the deployment of a fingerprint-based authentication 
system in a new mobile phone attract new customers for a 
mobile phone vendor? Thus all security related investments 
must be compared in terms of mitigation of amollnt of po-
tentially dangerous events (for own usage) or payback (for 
a security feature in some product or service which you are 
offering). 
But in order to perform such evaluation there must be a 
way how to estimate an amollnt of potential ISRI (and thus 
losses) related to a given technology and a given type of 
ISRI. Thus there must be a methodology to make an ISRI 
forecasting. 
According to [1] there are three types of forecasts: long 
term (concerned with strategic decisions, looking ahead for 
several years), middle term (concerned with tactical deci-
sions, looking ahead for more then a month but up to sev-
eral years) and short term (concerned with operational deci-
sions, looking ahead for the next few weeks) forecasts, As to 
information security, long term forecasting generally is not 
performed as even now this field of science is not strictly 
formalized and quantified (except for cryptology and side 
electronic radiation) and taking into account the speed of de-
velopment of new technological solutions, in order to fore-
cast severity of some threats in several years first of all it 
is necessary to forecast which technical solutions, protocols 
and etc. will be in place in several years. So security man-
agers uSllally have to focus on middle-term and short-term 
forecasts to plan required IT budget and estimate potential 
problems in the nearest future accordingly. 
There are many methods to perform forecasting, which 
are usually divided into two large groups [2]: qualitative 
and quantitative. Quantitative methods are again divided 
into two subgroups: projective methods (estimation of fu-
ture events is made by looking at the pattern of past obser-
vations and trying to extend it to future) and causal methods 
(estimation is made by the analysis of effects of outside in-
fluence to obtain equations which are later used for forecast-
ing of future values). 
In this paper we are providing an approach to make 
short-term and middle-term forecasts for a wide class of 
Copyright © 2010 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers 
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ISRI - unambiguously detectable ISRI, applying projective 
methods based on different auto regression models which 
are already widely used for forecasting in financial time se-
ries analysis, but can not be directly applied to ISRI data 
due to some relevant specifics [3] which is considered in 
detail in Sect. 3. In our approach we address this specifics 
and resolve problems which it causes by introduction of two 
special conditions (or rules) according to which ISRI time 
series data collection should be organized (see Sect. 3). 
To illustrate application of our approach we are taking 
amount of spam messages as a sample data. The spam statis-
tics was selected as the easiest real statistics to be collected 
without making special efforts (like organizing special sand-
boxes). 
The originality of this paper is summarized as follows: 
(1) it proposes an easy but comprehensive approach to make 
efficient quantitative short-term and middle-term forecasting 
for a wide class of information security related incidents, (2) 
it describes a way how to adapt already well-known auto re-
gression models to another class of time series - ISRI time 
series and thus to a new subject field -information security, 
and (3) it points out attention of security practitioners to 
gaps of currently available approaches for ISRI forecasting 
"and proposes solutions to cover these gaps. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 
we provide a survey of related research activities. In Sect. 3 
we describe specifics related to information security, dis-
cuss potential problems of forecasting in this field and pro-
pose our solutions to these problems. In Sect. 4 we present 
the proposed approach. Section 5 is devoted to example 
of application of the proposed approach to real ISRI time 
series - amount of spam messages and evaluation of its 
performance characteristics. Finally we give summary in 
Sect. 6. 
2. Related Studies 
Though the problem of ISRI forecasting is a very important 
one, it was not covered by research efforts until the very 
recent time. First attempts to perform forecasting in this 
field were related to a rather similar problem - forecasting 
of yet undiscovered vulnerabilities in software and the dis-
tribution of their severity levels basing on statistical reports, 
previously published by vendors or security experts. This 
task helps to provide an indirect estimation of reliability of 
a given software solution. Such research work was partially 
performed in [4] though the authors just made a seasonal 
analysis of vulnerability discovery process concluding that 
a forecasting is intended to be their future work. 
One of the first attempts to make ISRI forecasting 
was made in [5] where the authors proposed application 
of Bayesian inference for forecasting a trend of attack sig-
natures, defined by probabilities of increase or deCI'ease of 
event counts related to signatures of a given type of attack. 
The differences between our approach and approach from 
[5] are as follows: (I) difference in input data and outcomes. 
That is in [5] the authors consider not the actual number of 
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concrete attacks, but number of attack signatures related to 
a given type of attack and they actually forecast a number of 
attack signatures. Moreover as they use data aggregation, it 
could result in information loss problem (see Sect. 3.2), In 
our approach we consider and forecast a number of infor-
mation security related incidents (which includes number of 
all attack efforts) and do not use aggregation of data. (2) 
Difference in statistical considerations. That is as several 
different attacks could have same signatures, indirect fore-
casting of number of attacks by counting a number of attack 
signatures (instead of number of attacks) as proposed in [5], 
leads to problem of non-homogeneity of data in input time 
series (as number of attack signatures time series can con-
tain data related to many different attacks). Thus such fore-
casting method can lead to potentially ambiguous situations 
like the following one: suppose there are two attacks: A 
and B which can be detected by presence of the same attack 
signature X, but they differ in the frequency of occurrence 
of X (for example, in a given fixed time period, X occurs 
one time for attack A, but two times for attack B), Thus if 
there is a forecast that X is going to appear two times in the 
next time period, there is no way to distinguish if it means 
two occurrences of attack A or one occurrence of attack B. 
In our approach we pay especial attention to homogeneity 
of original time series and propose a solution to this prob-
lem in Sect. 3. (3) Difference in type of forecasting. That is 
in [5] the authors are forecasting the trend (increase or de-
crease) of event counts only for the next time period. We 
forecast the precise number of security incidents for a set of 
sequential time periods. So our approach can forecast not 
only the trend but also the time periods with and without 
ISRI. (4) Difference in initial assumptions. That is in [5] the 
authors assume that there could be only two possible types 
of fluctuations in event counts of attack signatures: cyclic 
change and rapid increase/rapid decrease, In our approach 
we do not make any preliminary assumptions regarding be-
havior of ISRI time series, we assume only that these ISRI 
are unambiguously detectable (see Sect. 3). 
Another interesting approach is proposed in [6] 
where the authors implemented Maximal Overlap Discrete 
Wavelet Transform to predict amount of network traffic sev-
eral hours ahead in the Incident Forecast Engine, The dif-
ferences between our approach and approach from [6] are as 
follows: (1) difference in input data and outcomes. Again in 
[6] the authors consider not the actual number of concrete 
attacks, but number of attack signatures (in this case some 
designated IP packets) and again they use aggregation. In 
our approach we consider direct number of ISRI and do not 
use aggregation. (2) Difference in statistical considerations. 
That is in [6] the authors decided considering a number of 
designated IP packets as an indirect method of detection of 
a potential ISRI, though again without assurance of explicit 
interrelation of these two values such assumption can lead 
to non-homogeneity and potentially ambiguous situations 
considered above (as it is clear that there can be many dif-
ferent attacks characterized by sending packets to a given 
TCP port). Thus again direct application of approach from 
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[6] (forecasting number of attacks by forecasting number of 
attack signatures) is not always possible. As was already 
mentioned above, in our approach we pay especial attention 
to the problem of homogeneity and propose a solution in 
Sect. 3. (3) Diflerence in usability. The approach presented 
in [6] requires non-standard software, though our approach 
can be executed on a wide spread set of software used for 
financial time series analysis. 
Another remarkable attempt was made in [7] where the 
authors tried to apply an ARIMA (autoregressive integrated 
moving average) model to make middle term forecasting 
for several types of security incidents. Unlike our model, 
which is mainly intended to create short - term forecasts 
estimating most probable time periods where upcoming in-
cidents can occur (of course, our model can also be used to 
make middle term forecasts), in [7] the authors are trying to 
forecast not the precise amount of upcoming incidents, but 
an average amount of such incidents in an upcoming week. 
Moreover in order to do it they use aggregated data. But, as 
the way the authors in [7] were collecting, storing and ana-
lyzing the data does not fit special conditions, originally in-
troduced in our model, the applicability and the efficiency of 
forecasts of their approach are lower than of our approach. 
Another difference is that in addition, we proposed to test 
ARCHjGARCH models in order to avoid problems caused 
by heteroskedasticity (as in general, it is not possible just to 
assume the homoskedasticity of data related to ISRI and to 
apply just ARIMA model). 
To sum up, we suppose that that there should be some 
other efforts to solve the task of ISRI forecasting, but most 
likely the results of these efforts were negative like in [8] 
because of the problems discussed in the next section. 
3. Problems of Information Security Related Incidents 
Forecasting 
In this section, we consider problems of ISRI forecasting 
process and propose solutions to these problems introducing 
rules of collection, count and storage of ISRI time series 
called special conditions. We also discuss the role of this 
rules and their contribution to forecasting process. 
3.1 Problem of Information Security Related Incidents 
Detection 
In order to perform an analysis of ISRI time series for a 
given type of incidents we must somehow obtain initial data. 
Thus there must be a detection criterion which for any fixed 
moment of time and a given type of ISRI can unambigu-
ously determine if there is/was such an incident at this mo-
ment of time or not. Thus it is possible to divide all ISRI 
into two different groups: those which can be unambigu-
ously detected by some criterion either right at the moment 
of OCCUlTence or some time later (we call such ISRI as un-
ambiguously detectable) and those which can be detected 
with less than 100% warranty or can not be detected at all 
(we call such ISRI as unambiguously undetectable). Thus 
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the key features of unambiguously detectable ISRI are that 
an amount and a tiliJle of occurrence of such incidents can be 
measured precisely. Examples of unambiguously detectable 
ISRI are: an unschedl:11ed shutdown of a server, a fraudulent 
transaction in a bank account, an attempt of robbery or a 
theft of a good in a shop, a user's account locked due to rnul-
tiple incorrect password input, a spam message in a mailbox 
etc. As to unambiguously undetectable lSRI, one example 
is a presence of a new computer virus in a given worksta-
tion. The reason is that it is not always possible to detect a 
new virus if its signature is not yet familiar to any antivirus 
software and it i'las not yet made any noticeable activity (for 
example, it is designed to make such harmful activity at a 
fixed future date or it just makes this workstation a part of a 
botnet). Another example is an occurrence of a special net-
work attack. The reason is that sometimes it is difficult to 
distinguish an attempt to perform a network attack in a net-
work traffic flow unless it leads to any significant damage. 
But even though some given class of ISRI must be con-
sidered as unambiguously undetectable at the current time, 
there could be a solution for unambiguous detection in fu-
ture. 
Further in this paper we assume that our approach is 
applied to any unambiguously detectable ISRI, though, of 
course, it is possible to try to apply it to unambiguously un-
detectable ISRI as well. But there is no way to confirm ef-
fectiveness of such forecasts because if we can not detect 
something every time when it occurs, we can not count all 
of its occurrences it and thus make forecasts. But if there 
is a criterion which makes unambiguous detection possible 
(like approach proposed in [6] for some network attacks) 
forecasting of such ISRI becomes efl:ective as well. 
3.2 Problem of Non-homogeneity 
In order to make an effective forecasting, initial data in 
time series must come from same probabilistic distribution 
[9] (otherwise samples from different distributions will sup-
press each other). This problem is called the problem of 
homogeneity of original data. In general it is addressed by 
means of logical considerations but in ISRI forecasting it 
must be treated in a special way because of specifics related 
to this subject area. This specifics results in two additional 
subtasks which must be solved to build an effective forecast-
ing methodology: 
• Accurate measurement of amount of ISRI occurrences. A 
factor which typically leads to inaccurate measurement is 
an intention to use indirect estimation of amount of ISRI 
by measurement of related incidents' signatures. This 
could happen either because of complete infeasibility to 
measure an amount of incidents (like for some of unam-
biguously undetectable ISRI) or because by some reasons 
it is easier to measure an amount of signatures but not an 
amount incidents. And as we already mentioned above, 
as such signatures could be correlated with many differ-
ent ISRI, such measurement potentially results in non-
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homogeneity of collected data sample. In our approach 
we avoid this situation by considering only direct mea-
surement of unambiguously detectable ISRI. 
• Loss of homogeneity due to unnoticeable changes of dis-
tribution parameters. As we showed in [3], this situation 
happens because of general properties of all modern IT 
landscapes: huge heterogeneity (a typical landscape in-
corporates dozens of solutions from different vendors) 
and extremely rapid changes in its structure and each 
of its elements. Thus, as both of the components caus-
ing/mitigating failures or ISRI are permanently changing, 
it makes difficult to directly apply traditional statistical 
methods to evaluate distribution function of some failures 
or incidents. A possible solution for this task is temporary 
stabilization of the state of an IT landscape. In [10] we 
presented a way how to achieve such stabilization at least 
for some time by proposal to perform continuous collec-
tion of ISRI statistics only for those elements which are 
not changing their state in terms of being vulnerable to 
some specific malicious actions - threats leading to ISRI 
(but if the state has changed, previously collected statis-
tics must be discarded). But as generally state must be 
changed rather often (as it is impossible just to sit and 
wait collecting statistics while your systems are being at-
tacked or are expiring continuous technical failures), col-
lection of appropriate amount of statistical data for fur-
ther analysis is not a trivial task. And if there is a lack 
of statistical data, there is a lack of reasonable forecasts. 
In this paper we improve previous proposal by introduc-
tion of a rule of collection of ISRI time series data. We 
call it special condition I (SC-l): we collect data related 
not only to occurred incidents, but also to those which 
were successfully mitigated by all implemented counter-
measures related to selected type of incidents. It means 
that for a given module or system (for which the statistics 
is collected) and for a selected type of ISRI we must un-
derstand all mechanisms which protect this module from 
this selected type of ISRI and we must count all attempts 
(both occurred and prevented) to damage it. An amount 
of all attempts is called an amount of potentially danger-
ous events. In terms of mathematical statistics it means 
that even if the module/system is changed, we can con-
tinue collection of data as we are measuring an amount of 
potentially dangerous events (in other words, original dis-
tribution of a threat related to this ISRI [11]) and it does 
not depend on a current configuration or set of counter-
measures. Afterwards we can use this data for forecast-
ing of both an amount of potentially dangerous events 
and amount of ISRI. In order to forecast an amount of 
ISRI we make a correction subtracting from a forecasted 
amount of potentially dangerous events amount of events, 
prevented by a newly introduced countermeasures. Thus 
SC-l helps us to save significant amount of collected data 
which, if SC-I is not met, must be discarded. 
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3.3 Problem of Information Loss 
As for unambiguously detectable ISRI an amount of such 
incidents is a measurable variable, in terms of signal pro-
cessing theory it is possible to consider it as an output gen-
erated by some random process with some properties. At 
the same time currently it is very popular to store and to 
process not the full amount of collected statistical data, but 
some aggregation of it. For example instead of amounts of 
incidents for a given hour, minute and second, there will be 
the whole amount of incidents per hour or per day or even 
per week. Thus instead of considering continuous-time pro-
cess, giving mostly zeros but sometimes non-zero values, 
we are making it discrete by sampling its values in time do-
main and afterwards additionally aggregate these discrete 
values taking into account only non-zero values. From the 
theoretical point of view both of these steps lead to potential 
loss of information [12]. According to the sampling theo-
rem [13], in order not to loose the information, the sampling 
frequency must be at least 2 times higher then the Nyquist 
frequency of the signal we are observing. So only having the 
Nyquist frequency of the generating process we can select 
the proper time interval when to measure amount of inci-
dents. Of course most of the measured values will be zeros, 
but the problem is with the right amount of zeros between 
informative non-zero values. This fact, in turn, means that 
we must have some prior information about the Nyquist fre-
quency of the process we are observing. Unfortunately this 
is usually impossible for processes generating ISRI. 
In order to overcome this problem we introduce a rule 
of count and storage of ISRI time series data. We call it 
special condition 2 (SC-2): incident statistics should be col-
lected and stored at the highest possible echelon of accu-
racy over the time domain. It should not be aggregated. 
This rule helps avoiding unnecessary aggregation in order to 
be able to distinguish time intervals between different inci-
dents. Such a rule helps us to collect all possible information 
about a time of occurrence given technical limits of preci-
sio~ of a device used to measure time. Anyhow the amount 
of data can later be reduced if forecasting works good on the 
aggregated samples as well. 
3.4 Role of Special Conditions in Forecasting of ISRI 
Special conditions SC-l and SC-2 introduced above should 
be understood as rules which must be used by an implemen-
tation team to organize a collection and processing of ISRI 
time series data. 
The contribution of special conditions to ISRI forecast-
ing process is as follows: 
II Application of SC-l together with direct measurement 
of unambiguously detectable ISRI allows collection of 
laraer amounts of homoaenous data which is required b b 
for forecasting. Moreover, as this data reflects the dis-
tribution of a threat related to selected incident, obtained 
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forecasts can be adjusted for simulation purposes-
prediction of an amount of occurred ISRI with a specified 
configuration of countermeasures. 
<& Application of SC-2 protects from information loss 
caused by discrete sampling and aggregation of collected 
data. 
Special conditions do not imply strict limitations and 
can be easily applied to any unambiguously detectable ISRI 
as according to Sect. 3.1 for any of such incidents we can 
precisely detect its occurrence (thus coveling SC-I), mea-
sure time of OCCUlTence and amount of such incidents (thus 
covering SC-2). Of course in order to perform such mea-
surement there must be a detection criterion (which exists 
for any unambiguously detectable ISRI). In general, de-
tection criteria for occurrence of ISRI are observations of 
some unclaimed actions. For prevented potentially danger-
ous events such criteria are usually built directly in coun-
termeasures. Thus selection of a detection criterion is not a 
difficult task for a security specialist. For example: 
• Incident: an"ival of a spam message. Countermeasure: 
antispam system. Amount of prevented ISRI: number of 
filtered spam messages. Amount of occurred ISRI: num-
ber of non-filtered spam messages in mailboxes (can be 
counted by users). 
• Incident: data loss occurred due to malware. Counter-
measure: backup procedure. Amount of prevented ISRI: 
number of times when the data was recovered from a 
backup medium. Amount of occurred ISRI: number of 
times when the data was not recovered. 
• Incident: fraudulent transaction for a credit card. Coun-
termeasure: policy of a payment system. Amount of pre-
vented ISRI: number of rejected transactions by policy 
criteria (like incorrect PIN2 code). Amount of occurred 
ISRI: number of disputed transactions. 
To sum up, introduction of SC-I and SC-2 helps to mit-
igate problems of non-homogeneity and information loss 
and to achieve the highest possible accuracy of fore-
castlng provided by selected underlying auto regression 
mathematical models. 
The novelty of these two conditions is that they: (1) 
help to understand and to correct gaps introduced by cur-
rently popular assumptions in the field of ISRI forecasting, 
thus improving the accuracy of such forecasting, and (2) 
allow a practical deployment of forecasting methodology 
without a need to deeply learn underlying statistical theo-
retical considerations. This makes a deployment of our ap-
proach easier as security experts may have no deep knowl-
edge in mathematical statistics. 
4. Proposed Approach 
In this section, we provide the descliption of the proposed 
approach. Its block scheme is presented on Fig. 1. 
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Application of special conditions 
Generate models 
Select best models 
Fig. I Proposed approach scheme. 
4.1 Collection of Data 
At this stage ISRI time series data must be collected with 
adherence to special conditions SC-l and SC-2, so 
• Data mllst be collected with the highest possible accuracy 
over the time domain and it should not be aggregated. 
• Data must be collected for all potentially dangerous 
events which could lead to ISRI if there is no any coun-
termeasure in place. Afterwards the forecast mllst be COf-
rected according to the average contribution of all avail-
able countermeasures for a given type of ISRI. 
4.2 Stationarity Check and Data Adjustment 
During these steps we must perform any of possible tests to 
check the stationarity of data. This step is an essential one 
as in order to check the significance of the coefficients in the 
auto regression model to be used for forecasting (introduced 
in detail below) the variance of the observed data must be 
estimated and it must be finite [14]. But as it is finite for 
stationary processes only, the time series to which we are 
trying to apply these models must be stationary. The most 
popular stationarity tests are Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
or Philip Peron tests [14], [15]. If data is stationary, we can 
go to the next step. If not, we must perform data adjustment 
taking the difference of order d Cd = 1,2,3 ... ) and perform 
the check again for adjusted time series till we find d when 
the data becomes stationary [16] (see Eq. (1)). Here Y/ is 
initial ISRI time series at time t, y~d) is an integrated time 
series order d. We will use this new adjusted time series for 
all next steps. 
(1)_ 
Y/ -Yt-Y/-I 
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(2) (I) (I) 
Y1 = Yt - Y1-l = YI - YI-! - Yt-I - Yt-2 
= Yt - 2YI-I + Yt-2 
(d) (d-I) (d-l) 
Y1 = Y1 - Y1- 1 (1) 
4.3 Correlogram Check 
In order to generate auto regression models at the next step, 
we must find the maximum significant orders of autocor-
relation CAC) and partial autocorrelation (PAC) functions. 
The theoretical background of this technique is described in 
[15]. In short, we must select the highest value of an AC 
coefficient which is significant in terms of selected confi-
dence level for the maximum order of autoregressive CAR) 
part and the highest level of PAC coefficient which is signif-
icant in terms of selected confidence level for the maximum 
order of moving average (MA) part. 
4.4 Generate Models 
There are several models which should be generated. The 
detailed description of all these models is provided in [16]. 
First of a11 it is necessary to try a simple autoregressive 
(AR) model, defined in Eq. (2). Here c is the expectation of 
y, p - order of the autoregressive process, Ct:j are estimated 
coefficients and bl is an error term. In this model error term 
is assumed to be distributed as N(O, 0-2). 
p 
y, = c + I Ct:iYH + bl 
i=1 
(2) 
Then autoregressive models with moving average 
(ARMA) of order (p, q), defined in Eg. (3), should be gen-
erated. Here p is the order of the autoregressive process, 
q - order of the moving average, Ct:j are estimated coeffi-
cients for autoregressive part, j3i are coefilcients for moving 
average part. 
p q 
YI = C + I Ct:iYH + If3jCI-j + c, (3) 
i=l j=l 
If original ISRI time series, Yr was non-stationary and 
ARMA (p, q) model was applied to stationary adjusted time 
series, y;d), such a model is considered as a generalization 
of ARMA model to autoregressive integrated moving aver-
age (ARIMA) model of order (p, d, q) where d is order of 
adjusted time series [16]. Thus if ARIMA (p, d, q) model is 
applied to YI it turns into ARIMA (p, 0, q) which by defini-
tion is ARMA (p,q) [16]. 
As it was pointed out above, ARMA and thus ARIMA 
model relies on the assumption that an error term has a con-
stant variance. But as there is no way to prove this property 
for processes generating ISRI, we must consider more gen-
eral situation. Such cases can be modeled by the following 
models which should be applied right after ARIMA models. 
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An autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (AR-
CH) model considers the variance 0-2 of the current error 
term c, to be a function of the previous time periods' error 
terms (see Eq. (4». Here Ct:j are estimated coefficients and w 
is the order of ARCH term. It is commonly used in modeling 
time series that exhibit time-varying volatility clustering, i.e. 
periods of swings followed by periods of relative calm. 
(4) 
ARCH can be generalized to make the conditional vari-
ance a function of past conditional variances in which case 
the model is called generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH). GARCH (u, w) is defined in 
Eq. (5), where u is the order of GARCH term and w is the 
order of ARCH term. 
(5) 
The way all these models are generated is as follows 
[16], [17]: according to the maximum order of AR and MA 
parts obtained at the correlogram check stage, we start gen-
erating models with all possible combinations of AR and 
MA parts. The total number of ARIMA models is defined 
in Eq. (6) as multiplication of sum of the corresponding bi-
nomial coefficients. 
NumberARIMA = t, ( ~ )x t, ( q ) (6) 
Afterwards, we perform the next step for all generated 
models. And for the best of them in terms of Sect. 4.5 we 
perform generation of ARCH and GARCH models. The 
methodology of selection of orders of ARCH and GARCH 
terms is described in detail in [18]. In short, we must per-
form Ljung-Box test for randomness applied to the auto-
correlation values of c2 . The ARCH/GARCH order will be 
given by the number of lags in the Ljung-Box test at which 
the null hypothesis needs to be rejected. As it is a probabilis-
tic test, it is recommended to take a 5% significance level. 
Here it is necessary to note, that most of modern statistical 
software allows automatic fitting of ARCH/GARCH mod-
els, so in order to use these models, there is no need to know 
all the mathematical background of its operation. 
The best models are again selected according to the 
procedure in Sect. 4.5. 
4.5 Selection of Best Models 
During this step it is necessary to select models with mini-
mum values of Akaike and Schwartz statistics. Related the-
oretical considerations can be found in [16]. If in short, the 
coefficients in ARIMA models are estimated according to 
the maximum likelihood criteria. But these criteria increase 
together with number of dependant variables. So in order 
to correct this fact, Akaike and Schwartz criteria were in-
troduced. As in general each of these criteria can select a 
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Table 1 Possible situations. 
Forecasting Real result 
statement Incident OCCUlTed Incident did not 
occur 
Incident Correct forecast Error type II 
will happen Situation A (false negative or 
(c-I) fi) 
Situation D 
Incident Error type I Correct forecast 
will not (false positive or Situation C 
happen ex) 
(c-2) Situation B 
different model as the best one, we recommend taking the 
model with the smallest criteria value. 
4.6 Making a Forecast 
Having obtained the best model from the previous stages, 
we apply it to make a forecast (a forecasting statement for 
each given time period). To do this, we should just put 
previously observed data in the obtained equation and start 
generating values of the forecasting function. As all the in-
volved models are standard models for time series analy-
sis, the variance of forecasted values can be estimated by 
equations related to these models, which can be found, for 
example in [16] or [] 9]. We are not providing these equa-
tions here as they do not have a direct link with the proposed 
methodology. 
As a result, for each time period t (defined by the pe-
riod of sampling used in SC-2) we obtain a value of forecast-
ing function fr and its variance 0-;. Afterwards we make a 
forecasting statement according to the following procedure, 
based on approach presented in [20]: 
• We define two classes: (c-l) ISRI will happen at time 
period t, and (c-2) ISRI will not happen at time period 
t. To make a forecasting statement at a time period t we 
need to make a selection of a class for this time period. 
It We define a classification rule to make a class selection by 
setting a threshold value T/ for values of forecasting func-
tion (see Eq. (7)). In our approach we decided to select a 
constant threshold value for any t. He1=e x is a parameter 
which together with threshold value should be estimated 
as described in [21]. 
If fr ± x * 0-, 2: TI , select c-l 
If.ft ± x * 0-, < T" select c-2 
4.7 Accuracy of Forecasting 
(7) 
While making a forecasting statement we can make either 
a correct statement (which results in correct forecast) or an 
incorrect statement (which results in forecasting elTor). Ac-
cording to [22] there could be two different types of errors 
(see Table 1). Figure 2 shows graphical representation of 
possible situations. 
Amount of 
incidents 
1 --
ffi Error type II 
Threshold 
- - - - ·value, 
T 
C D Time period, t ® Error type I 
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@ Real result (jJ)) Forecasting statement e Correct forecast 
---- Forecasting ftlnction,.t~. .j;+x*(lt, 
Fig. 2 Graphical representation of forecasting accuracy evaluation. 
For ISRI forecasting we should understand conse-
quences of these errors as follows: 
• Error type I (false positive): we decided not to prepare 
for an incident at a given time period t, but it happened 
and we suffered from loss caused by incident. 
• Error type II (false negative): we prepared for an inci-
dent at a given time period t, but it did not happen and 
we suffered from loss caused by erroneous preparation. 
An ideal, but usually unachievable case is when both 
Q and f3 are zeros [23]. In mathematical statistics a task to 
make a classification rule sounds like "with a given level 
of false positive (or false negative) develop a selection rule 
which provides minimum possible value of alternative error 
type." In information security selection of a classification 
rule must be made by security manager as it can be different 
for different types of ISRI. For example, for access control a 
rule usually is: with a given error type II (when we refuse to 
legal users), minimize error type I (when we let a fraudster 
go inside). But for spam detection system a rule usually is: 
with a given error type I (when we let a spam message go 
inside a mailbox), minimize error type II (when we drop a 
proper message). 
5. Case Study and Evaluation 
In this section, we provide an application of the proposed 
approach to forecasting of spam messages. We also evalu-
ate its performance characteristics and demonstrate contri-
bution of special conditions to forecasting process. 
For making forecasts we used spam messages statis-
tics collected during 68 days (07/2009-09/2009) in a small 
enterprise which is located in Europe and is working in mar-
keting business. This data was collected with adherence to 
special conditions (introduced above) and was stored on the 
hourly basis. For the current example this was sufficient as 
the rate of spam messages was lower. If there were several 
messages in one single hour, we would have to switch to 
a shorter period up to the shortest, supported by measuring 
equipment. 
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Explanation of all metrics and abbreviations presented 
in tables below can be found in [24] and [25] and [16]. 
5.1 Case Study 
5.1.1 Contribution of Special Conditions 
As it is possible to count precise number of occurred inci-
dents (amount of spam messages) and precise time of in-
cident's occurrence (time of arrival), an arrival of a spam 
messages belongs to unambiguously detectable ISRI. Thus 
application of special conditions to this type of ISRI is fea-
sible. 
In order to illustrate contribution of special conditions, 
we made adjustment of originally collected data by simula-
tion that SC-l and SC-2 were not used. 
To show contribution of SC-I we simulated deploy-
ment of the following countermeasure: antispam system 
with the policy to filter all messages from free public mail 
servers (yahoo, hotmail etc.) and from each address from 
other mail servers which were previously used to deliver 
spam (to simulate a kind of adaptive learning). We simu-
lated that this new countermeasure was added after 1 day of 
initial observations. And as almost every day there was a 
spam message from non free mail server, the list of filtered 
addresses was frequently changing. Thus when we applied 
this countermeasure to original data it resulted in dropping 
of more than 95% of it. Thus if SC-l is not met and we count 
only amount of OCCUlTed ISRI, we will loose more than 95% 
of collected data. 
In order to show contribution of SC-2 and the loss of in-
formation occurred as the result of aggregation, the original 
ISRI time series data was aggregated to obtain daily values. 
The Fourier spectrum obtained by calculation of Discrete 
Fourier Transformation for both time series is displayed on 
Fig. 3 (presented as a line plot, covering value for each fre-
quency). It is clear that spectrums are significantly differ-
Fig. 3 Fourier transformation for original and aggregated data. 
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ent from each other. The aggregated data spectrum is much 
smoother and also does not have some of original harmon-
ics. 
Results of Augmented Dickey Fuller test for stationar-
ity of original and aggregated data are presented in Table 2 
and Table 3 accordingly. In both cases the data is stationary. 
So we can proceed with the correlogram analysis. 
Correlograms for aggregated and original data are pre-
Table 2 Augmented Dickey Fuller test for original data. 
jI,ugrnented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Jl.uqrnenled Dickev-Fuller test statistic 
Test critical values: 1 % level 
5% level 
10% level 
t-Statistic 
-19.19870 
-2.566382 
-1.941018 
-1.616569 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
INCIDEr'H(-1) 
D(lNCIDENT(-1)) 
D(lr'>lCIDENT(-2)) 
-0.735758 0.038323 -19.19870 
-0.164461 0.033041 -4.977 441 
-0.090522 0.024698 -3.665224 
Prob.* 
0.0000 
Prob. 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0003 
Table 3 Augmented Dickey Fuller test for aggregated data. 
Jl.ugmented Dickey-FullerTest Equation 
Jl.ugmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 
Test critical values: 1 % level 
5% level 
10% level 
t-Statistic Prob.* 
-7.419528 0.0000 
-3.531592 
-2.905519 
-2.590262 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INCIDEr\lT(-1) 
C 
-0.927221 0.124970 -7.419528 0.0000 
2.863610 0.432371 6.623039 0.0000 
,A,utocorrelalion Partial Correlation Jl.C PfI.C Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.112 0.112 
2 0.104 0.093 
3 0.043 0.023 
4 -0.062 -0.080 
5 0.028 0.037 
6 0.072 0.081 
7 0.067 0.052 
8 -0.170 -0.214 
9 -0.133 -0.118 
10 -0.068 0.007 
11 -0.142 -0.091 
12 -0.044 -0.054 
13 -0.077 -0.073 
14 -0:196 -0:156 
15 -0.031 0.048 
16 -0.064 -0.040 
17 0.049 0.037 
18 0.214 0.214 
19 0.047 -0.015 
20 -0.066 -0:148 
21 -0.107 -0.129 
22 0.039 0.D35 
23 -0.021 -0.044 
24 0.224 0.162 
25 0.089 -0.031 
26 0.076 0.143 
27 -0.005 0.014 
28 -0.027 -0.072 
Fig. 4 Correlogram of aggregated data. 
0.8551 
1.6096 
1.7407 
2.0183 
2.0750 
2.4591 
2.7986 
5.0095 
6.3942 
6.7567 
8.3853 
8.5465 
9.0479 
12.332 
12.418 
12.779 
'12.998 
17.232 
17.440 
17.864 
18.992 
19.146 
19.190 
24.518 
25.382 
26.024 
26.027 
26.112 
0.355 
0.447 
0.628 
0.732 
0.839 
0.873 
0.903 
0.757 
0.700 
0.748 
0.678 
0.741 
0.769 
0.580 
0.647 
0.689 
0.736 
0.507 
0.560 
0.596 
0.586 
0.636 
0.690 
0.432 
0.441 
0.462 
0.517 
0.567 
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Autocorrelation Partial Correlation 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
I, 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
AC PAC 
1 0.006 0.006 
2 -0.018 -0.018 
3 -0.004 -0.004 
4 -0.027 -0.027 
5 -0.032 -0.032 
6 -0.018 -0.018 
7 0.006 0.005 
8 -0.046 -0.048 
9 -0.037 -0.038 
10 0.006 0.002 
11 -0.017 -0.020 
12 -0.013 -0.016 
13 -0.018 -0.023 
14 0.020 0.016 
15 -0.013 -0.016 
16 0.039 0.036 
17 -0.008 -0.016 
18 -0.023 -0.023 
19 -0.013 -0.015 
20 0.024 0.023 
21 -0.004 -0.007 
22 0.015 0.015 
23 0.072 0.069 
24 0.091 0.093 
25 0.006 0.012 
26 0.020 0.023 
27 -0.018 -0.013 
28 0.001 0.015 
29 0.002 0.013 
30 -0.017 -0.014 
31 -0.008 0.002 
32 -0.017 -0.005 
33 0.003 0.013 
34 0.007 0.012 
35 -0.030 -0.025 
36 0.026 0.027 
37 -0.002 0.001 
38 -0.025 -0.028 
39 -0.020 -0.025 
40 0.027 0.018 
41 -0.025 -0.021 
42 -0.020 -0.017 
43 0.013 0.006 
44 0.022 0.017 
45 -0.030 -0.032 
Fig. 5 Correlogram of original data. 
Q-Stal Prob 
0.0539 0.816 
0.5778 0.749 
0.6019 0.896 
1.7846 0.775 
3.4275 0.634 
3.9356 0.685 
3.9923 0.781 
7.4709 0.487 
9.6816 0.377 
9.7340 0.464 
10.231 0.510 
10.499 0.572 
11.005 0.610 
11.670 0.633 
1·1.948 0.683 
14.428 0.567 
14.545 0.628 
15.392 0.635 
15.684 0.678 
16.663 0.675 
16.690 0.730 
17.050 0.761 
25.598 0.320 
39.206 0.026 
39.260 0.035 
39.908 0.040 
40.447 0.047 
40.450 0.060 
40.456 0.077 
40.939 0.088 
41.038 0.107 
41.531 0.121 
41.544 0.146 
41.636 0.173 
43.174 0.162 
44.313 0.161 
44.3·18 0.190 
45.386 0.191 
46.058 0.203 
47.280 0.200 
48.319 0.201 
49.008 0.213 
49.276 0.237 
50.088 0.245 
51.592 0.232 
sented on Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 accordingly. As we can see form 
correlogram for aggregated data, there are no neither AC nor 
PAC coefficients which are higher then significance level. 
This means that obtained data has properties of white noise 
and there is no way to make any other forecast except to 
state that the data will fluctuate around its mean value. As 
to the non-aggregated original data, there are rather many 
significant AC and PAC coefficients. 
5.1.2 Generation of Models and Forecasting 
According to Sect. 4, now we need to generate auto regres-
sion models. In order to do it, we again use correlogram of 
original data (Fig. 5). 
The highest significant coefficient's number is 169. So 
it means that we must generate all combinations with orders 
p and q of AR and MA up to 169. The result of the best 
model selection according to both Akaike and Schwartz cri-
teria is shown in Table 4. According to z-Statistics values, 
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Table 4 Best model. 
Variable Coefficient Stcf Error I-Statistic Prob. 
AR(24) 0.268798 0.046207 5.817249 0.0000 
... ·\R(72) 0.339394 0.049067 6.916916 0.0000 
AR(168) 0.241110 0.044762 5.386447 0.0000 
AR(169) 0.122613 0.022188 5.526029 0.0000 
M.A.(24) -0.227439 0.049841 -4.563296 0.0000 
MA(72) -0.319726 0.051677 -6.186990 0.0000 
MA(168) -0.273580 0.049981 -5.473688 0.0000 
MA(169) -0.121'631 0.032083 -3.791145 0.0001 
Variance Equation 
Constant 0.013055 0.001343 9.722474 0.0000 
ARCH(-1) -0.007839 0.00·1332 -5.884501 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) 0.816526 0.024004 34.01561 0.0000 
G.A.RCH(-2) 0.925229 0.013612 67.97274 0.0000 
GARCH(-3) -0.839327 0.020838 -40.27797 0.0000 
R-squared 0.035147 Mean dependent var 0.128503 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027162 S.D. dependent var 0.360348 
S.E. of regression 0.355420 AI<alke info criterion 0.755476 
Sum squared resid 183.1690 Sct1vvarz criterion 0.802466 
Log likBlihood -539.6304 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.773003 
Durbin-Watson stal 2.028150 
all the coefficients are significant. 
It means that our process is described as a sum of 
AR(24), AR(72), AR(168), AR(169), MA(24), MA(72), 
MA(168) and MA(169). As the data was observed on the 
hourly basis, it means that aI"nount of spam in a given hour 
depends on amounts of spam one day before (AR(24) and 
MA(24), three days ago (AR(72) and MA(72» and about a 
week ago (AR(l68), AR (169) and MA(l68), MA(169»). 
This dependency in the spam generating process shows 
us its internal characteristics. In this case it can indicate that 
a spam agent which is sending us messages has a regular 
schedule. 
As there are several significant ARCH/GARCH terms, 
it means that the variance of each error term is changing 
over the time and can be represented as a sum of ARCH 
and GARCH terms. According to Table 4 this process is 
GARCH order (3, 1). It means that the data is heteroskedas-
tic. 
Finally we can proceed with forecasting. An example 
of a real short-term forecasting with obtained model on a 
one day period ahead is shown on Fig. 6. Here forecasting 
statements are compared with real result values measured 
in addition to those initial 68 days considered for build-
ing the model. As sampling period in this case study was 
set to one hour, in total we have 24 time periods for one 
day ahead forecasting. Here we obtained constant threshold 
value T(= 1 and parameter x=2 (see Eq. (7)), standard error 
values were calculated according to procedure presented in 
[16]. 
We can also use Fig. 6 to perform rough estimation of 
accuracy of the proposed model: we can clearly see that the 
model has precisely indicated 2 of 3 hours where we should 
expect the next spam message (so there is only one occur-
rence of error type I) and all safe hours without spam were 
successfully detected (there are completely no occurrences 
of error type II). 
A middle-term forecast can be obtained by making 
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Table 5 Model comparison and performance characteristics. 
ARIMA ARIMA ARIMA, 
and ARCH and 
ARCH GARCH 
RMSE 0.3565 0.3565 0.3560 
FPR 0.]2 0.11 0.10 
FNR 0 0 0 
short-term forecast for a larger sequence of hours and then 
calculating mean and variance for this sequence taking into 
account that. each value in the sequence has its own variance 
because of heteroskedasticity. 
5.2 Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the proposed model, we are using a cross 
validation technique presented in [26]. With this method, all 
observed data is divided into two parts: training data and test 
data. Training data is used as an initial data to start forecast-
ing and test data is supposed to be yet unknown. After the 
forecasting procedure, forecasted values are compared with 
test data. There are no recommendations about the length 
of these parts (but the shorter is the training data the higher 
could be possible errors in forecasted data), so we selected 
15% of all data as training data and 85% as test data. The 
quality of forecasting can be estimated by parameters intro-
duced in [16]. 
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) allows estimating 
which forecasting model is the best one for a given set of 
data. But more critical task is to compare models between 
deferent sets of data. For such purpose we decided to use 
False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR). 
Comparison of different models is presented in Table 5, 
which shows that consideration of ARCH and GARCH 
terms improved the accuracy of forecasting. 
TErCE TRANS. COMMUN., VOL.E93-B, NO.6 JUNE 2010 
Unfortunately, the authors in [7] provide neither their 
data sets nor FPRjFNR values, so the direct comparison is 
not possible. But if to apply approach presented in [7] to the 
type ofISRI we were analyzing (thus collecting data without 
adherence to special conditions, introduced in our approach) 
we will have to use aggregated daily statistics (as it is pro-
posed in [7]) which leads us to the series with properties of 
white noise (see Sect. 5.1), and, in turn, to impossibility to 
make a meaningful short-term forecast. To conclude, appli-
cation of approach presented in [4] lead to negative results 
while our approach helped to resolve this problem. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed an approach to make a 
short-term and a middle-term forecasting for a wide class 
of ISRI - unambiguously detectable ISRI. 
In order to do that, we have considered specifics re-
lated to ISRI forecasting process and investigated its theo-
retical background. As a result we proposed solutions to 
these problems for unambiguously detectable ISRI by in-
troduction of rules of data collection and storage (special 
conditions) adherence to which improves forecasting in this 
subject field. 
We have confirmed the applicability and effectiveness 
of the proposed theoretical model to real data by an exam-
ple of application of our approach to statistics of spam mes-
sages. Finally we have made an evaluation of performance 
characteristics of the proposed approach which confirmed 
its robustness. 
The proposed approach is significantly different from 
previously available approaches by the way of collection 
of initial data, its further storage and underlying statistical 
considerations which makes model applicable in more situ-
ations, and by extension of underlining mathematical mod-
els to more general heteroskedastic models which help to 
increase accuracy of forecasting. 
The proposed approach improves quality and applica-
bility of previously available approaches and thus can be 
useful for practical applications. 
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